To coincide with my move to the University of Michigan, Seed Magazine has just published a series of ten questions and answers on what I do and what motivates me as a scientist.  You can read how well I fared (or didn’t, as the case may be) with questions as diverse as “How do you explain your job at cocktail parties?” to “Why do you do science?” on the Seed Magazine website.

I was surprised to hear that Seed sometimes have to hard-sell the idea of this series to scientists – who doesn’t want to pontificate about what they are reading, or who they would most like to meet?  But I must confess, answering questions like “Why do you do science?” and “What inspires you?” was tougher than I imagined.

Previous articles in Seed’s “10 Questions” series include:

• James Kasting on the odds of finding another earth-like planet and the power of science fiction;
• Kirsten Bomblies on the immune system of plants and how young scientists can keep inspiration alive;
• John Rinn onwhy we should dumpster-dive in our genomes and the inspiration of a middle-distance runner; and
• Amy Cannon on low-energy solar cells, training scientists to weed out toxicity, and what makes benign chemistry such a good business proposition.

]]> http://2020science.org/2010/04/06/cultivating-ingenuity-humility-in-an-increasingly-complex-world/feed/ 1 http://2020science.org/2010/03/08/new-report-on-science-and-trust-emphasizes-acknowledging-risk-and-uncertainty/ http://2020science.org/2010/03/08/new-report-on-science-and-trust-emphasizes-acknowledging-risk-and-uncertainty/#comments Mon, 08 Mar 2010 17:14:59 +0000 Andrew Maynard http://2020science.org/?p=2947

A new report released today from the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) Expert Group on Science and Trust emphasizes the need to address risk and uncertainty in developing and using science and technology within society.  “Acknowledging risk and uncertainty” is the second of eight broad aspirations from the independent group, established to develop a UK action plan to “enhance society’s capabilities to make better-informed judgements about the sciences and their uses in order to ensure that the “license to operate” is socially robust.”

The report “Starting a National Conversation about Good Science” [PDF, 478 KB] is a rich, informative and insightful document, that demands careful consideration.  It comes out of a group assembled to consider new mechanisms to increase public trust in science and engineering; review the impact of the existing science-related ethical code of practice; examine how movement of knowledge and people across the different sectors can be facilitated in order to maximize the benefits and impacts of science and society activities; and think about better ways to evaluate the impacts of science and society initiatives.  Despite this being a purely British affair, many of the recommendations are relevant far beyond the confines of a UK-centered “national conversation,”  and will hopefully stimulate a global dialogue on what is a global challenge.

Amidst the eight “broad aspirations” of the group, which span public judgment about science and awareness of the scientific process, to underpinning science-informed decision-making and good science governance, I was particularly struck by an emphasis on risk and uncertainty.  This may be because in a few weeks I will becoming increasingly involved in risk, uncertainty and science-informed decision-making, as I take over as Director of the Risk Science Center at the University of Michigan.  But beyond this, I was struck by the group’s recognition that, from the publics’ various perspectives, uncertainties surrounding science and technology – their implications in particular – are often more important than the science and technology themselves.

The overarching aim of the Science and Trust Expert Group -  and of this report – was

“To enhance society’s capabilities to make better-informed judgements about the sciences and their uses in order to ensure that the “licence to operate” is socially robust.”

In this context,the group recommended that

“Expert advice to Government should identify and characterize uncertainties; policy makers should communicate clearly actions that take account of inevitable uncertainties; efforts should be made to support public judgements about risks and uncertainties.”

In particular, the report emphasizes the need to address uncertainties surrounding the potential impacts and benefits of emerging technologies “in the wider context of science and society relations.”

This emphasis on uncertainty is particularly welcome, and closely aligns with where I hope to be taking the University of Michigan Risk Science Center over the next few years.  New technologies – or innovative ways of using existing technologies for that matter – lead to inherently uncertain futures.  There is a great danger of mistaking this uncertainty for risk (risk is a reasonably well-understood chance of something bad happening; uncertainty is a poor understanding of whether good or bad will come out of a course of action) – with the result that there is a tendency to shy away from potentially beneficial technologies, simply because we don’t know how they are going to unfold.  On the other hand, uncertainty means that we do need to move forward carefully, in case there are very real and relevant risks lurking in the shadows.  The trick is to develop better ways of handling uncertainty so that the best possible choices are made.

Being up-front about uncertainty and potential risks associated with science and technology is a critical step toward developing conversations and actions that underpin a science-informed approach to minimizing and otherwise handling uncertainty and risk.  One particularly good resource that the report recommends is A Worriers’s Guide to Risk [PDF, 222 KB] – a one-pager intended to help everyone make more sense of the seemingly unending series of stories on risk.

In its specific recommendations and actions, the Science and Trust Expert Group includes:

• Support Government to take better account of risks and uncertainties in policy making;
• Support public judgements about risks and uncertainties inherent in the scientific advisory process;
• Support policy makers to take better account of public attitudes and values to the risks, benefits and uncertainties in the governance of emerging technologies;
• Enable wider discussions in the media and elsewhere on uncertainty inherent in the scientific process; and
• Enable greater discussion of risk.

Although these are aimed fair and square at the UK, they provide a valuable template for a global conversation about good science, and its role within society.  Hopefully, now that the UK has set the pace, we will see this develop as an International conversation about good science.

A new paper published on-line today in Nature Nanotechnology hints that some nanoparticles could cause damage to cells on the other side of normally tight barriers – such as the blood brain barrier or the placenta – without actually crossing the barriers.  It’s a study that could raise concerns over the safe  medical use of nanoparticles, at a time when the first human trials of “smart nanoparticle” therapeutics are being discussed.

Using an artificial system designed to investigate cellular barriers, Gevdeep Bhaba and co-authors show that high concentrations of Cobalt-Chromium alloy nanoparticles on one side of a tightly meshed layer of cells can cause measurable DNA damage to cells on the other side.  And they seem to do this without actually crossing the cellular barrier.

I’m not sure how much attention this paper will get, but given its apparent relevance to harm occurring across the placental barrier, there could be some pickup beyond the usual scientific outlets.  And interestingly, it is being published at the same time as the first human trials for a “smart nanoparticle” based cancer therapy are being reported – that’s a juxtaposition that could drive a substantial amount of interest in the research.

As I was asked to comment on it prior to its release, I thought it worth jotting some notes down here on the work, just in case anyone’s interested (I’ll be in the thick of a workshop on emerging technologies and emerging economies when the paper is published on-line, so this post is being written some time ahead of it going live).

In brief, the paper (Nanoparticles can cause DNA damage across a cellular barrier, by Gevdeep Bhaba et al., Nature Nanotechnology. DOI: 10.1038/NNANO.2009.313) describes a set of experiments carried out using an artificially grown layer of cells on a porous support.  The cells (BeWo cells for the interested, derived from a human trophoblast choriocarcinoma cell line) were grown as a multi-layered barrier, to simulate tight barriers in the body like the placental barrier.  On one side of this layer of cells were placed human fibroblast cells.  On the other side, Cobalt-Chromium alloy particles (CoCr particles) were placed.  Following introduction of the particles, the fibroblasts were checked for DNA damage using an alkaline comet assay.

Schematic of the system used by Bhabra and colleagues to investigate the potential for CoCr particles to cause DNA damage across tight cellular barriers (Nature Nanotechnology, DOI: 10.1038/NNANO.2009.313)

As you would expect in a good study, DNA damage was measured under a number of conditions, to identify what was going on.  Nanometer-scale and larger CoCr particles were used to see whether size was important.  Cobalt and Chromium ions were also used, to see whether the presence of dissolved metals was significant.  Particles were also introduced directly to the fibroblasts, to see what happened in the absence of the cellular barrier.  In addition, the concentration of Cobalt and Chromium was measured below the cellular barrier to see how much stuff (if any) got through.  And the barrier cells were treated with agents designed to block different transmission routes for certain substances, to get a handle on whether DNA damage was being caused by stuff penetrating through the barrier, or being generated (and subsequently released) from within the barrier.

The upshot of all this was that the researchers found evidence that placing Cobalt or Chromium one one side of the barrier caused measurable DNA damage in the fibroblasts on the other side, and that the damage seemed to be associated with chemicals generated within the cellular barrier by the metals.  In other words, the combination of CoCr particles and cellular barrier seemed to lead to DNA damage the other side of the barrier, even though the particles didn’t cross it!

The authors of the paper conclude:

We suggest that an evaluation of nanoparticle safety should not rely on whether they fail to gain access to privileged sites.  Instead there should also be an evaluation of their genotoxic potential for both direct and indirect effects to avoid any potential risks to targets on the distal [far] side of cellular barriers.

However, while this is an interesting paper, it wold be dangerous to speculate too far on what its relevance to nanoparticle safety.  When asked to comment briefly on the paper by the Science Media Center in the UK, this is what I wrote:

This is a study that raises an intriguing question – can foreign materials in the body cause harm across barriers like the placenta and the blood-brain barrier without actually crossing the barriers?  Evidence is presented that suggests there is some possibility of this occurring.  But the results should be treated with a high degree of caution until more is known.  In particular:

The effects seen are do not seem to be confined to nanoparticles alone.  There is some evidence that even large particles containing Cobalt and Chromium – the two specific materials studied here – can exert their influence across barriers in the body.

No evidence is presented to suggest that this is a way in which all nanoparticles can cause harm, as opposed to the specific types of nanoparticles tested.

From these results, it is not possible to say whether the observed effects could occur under real-life conditions, or whether harm could be caused at realistic exposure levels.  The concentrations of material used were very high – the equivalent of the placenta in a 9 months pregnant woman being exposed to approximately 4 – 40 grams of material. Whether such high exposures to materials like the ones used will ever occur is questionable.

While the study opens up new avenues of research, and should be of particular interest to scientists developing new nanoparticle-based drugs and medical devices, it is too early to say whether materials in the body – including nanomaterials – are likely to cause damage across normally tight barriers like the placenta.

In other words, a fascinating piece of science that raises the possibility of a novel way in which materials could cause harm, but which sheds little light on the likelihood of this being a significant concern from real products in real people.

The bottom line here is that, while this is a scientifically interesting study, it is far removed from implying that specific types of nanoparticles in the body could actually cause significant harm in this way.  Certainly, it suggests more research is needed in this area – especially as an increasing number of drugs and medical devices are developed that rely on nanoparticles, and as these products enter the human trials phase.  But at the moment, the data do not support nanoparticle-related DNA damage across the placenta (or any other tight biological barrier) as being a probable cause of serious harm.

]]> http://2020science.org/2009/11/05/could-nanoparticles-inflict-harm-across-tight-cellular-barriers/feed/ 9 http://2020science.org/2009/10/23/risk-innovation-you-what-desparately-seeking-advice/ http://2020science.org/2009/10/23/risk-innovation-you-what-desparately-seeking-advice/#comments Fri, 23 Oct 2009 14:07:39 +0000 Andrew Maynard http://2020science.org/?p=2348

Here’s something I’ve been chewing over for the past few weeks:  How do you capture succinctly the idea of developing innovative new approaches to identifying, assessing, managing and otherwise dealing with risks to human health?

What I’ve ended up with is “Risk Innovation” – but I’m not convinced it works.

So I thought I would see if anyone else had any other bright ideas!

This is the challenge in a nut shell:

When dealing with the possibility of substances harming people, there are well-established science-based approaches to identifying and quantifying the risks, backed up by a standard set of approaches to dealing with them (with regulation typically rising to the top of the pile).  But these aren’t always effective – and as technologies become more complex, development life cycles become faster and societal hierarchies shift, there’s going to be an increasing need to find new ways to deal with possible health impacts arising from substances.

In fact, the life cycle of new technologies is becoming so short that it won’t be long before they are superseded long before conventional approaches to assessing and managing risks have kicked in.

In other words, technology innovation has to be accompanied by innovations in how we handle risks, if things are going to get better rather than worse for us in the future.

This is a young area of research that is developing rapidly.  It’s stimulating, exciting and, above all, crucial to the success of emerging technologies (as well as dealing with new problems emerging from previous technologies).

But it doesn’t have a convenient “handle.”

“Innovation in risk identification, assessment, management and governance” gets to the nub of the idea.  But it is also on the soporific side of engaging.  Not to beat about the bush, it’s just not sexy!  The same goes for various other permutations that try to capture accurately the idea of developing new approaches to handling risk.

So what I’ve ended up with is “Risk Innovation.”

My problem though is that, while the phrase is catchy, it’s wide open to interpretation.  It could mean anything from innovative approaches to dealing with risk, to innovative ways of increasing risk – not something most self-respecting health professionals would want to be associated with!!

But what’s the alternative?  Or am I being over-sensitive here?

Any thoughts here (please use the comments area below) would be more than welcome.

Thanks!

Where’s the best place to look for down to earth information on nanotechnology safety?  Surprisingly, given how much time I spend speaking and writing about the subject, I don’t think I have ever sat down and compiled such a list.  But while preparing for this year’s annual meeting of the Nanotechnology Informal Science Education Network (NISE Net) (surely the coolest nanotech meeting around by the way!) it struck me that such a list might actually be useful.

So here’s my first cut at some places you might want to look if you are interested in nanotech safety.

It’s by no means exhaustive, and it was compiled primarily to support my talk at the NISE Net annual meeting this week.  But it might be of some use – especially if you are interested in the subject, but don’t know where to start.

In putting the list together, I’ve tried to focus on papers and websites that are informative and trustworthy (in my opinion), that you don’t need a PhD in nanotoxicology to get something out of, and that are freely available. In each case, I have tried to provide some idea of what each resource covers, and who might find it useful.

There are bags more good resources out there – this is just a start.  But hopefully, it’s a useful one.

Nano & Me

Nano & Me

What is it? A website targeted at providing readers with clear and accessible information on nanotechnology.  Created by the UK-based Responsible Nano Forum and the Together Agency, and supported by the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), it covers everything from what nanotech is, to where it’s being used.  The website’s coverage of safety issues is simple, clear and balanced.

Who should use it? Anyone who wants to know more about nanotechnology, but especially newbie’s to the subject.  No science required.

What I like about it: A slick website that puts the information you are looking for at your fingertips, without being condescending or confusing.  Highly recommended.

Link: http://www.nanoandme.org

Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: Opportunities and uncertainties

Royal Society

What is it? An influential 2004 review of the opportunities and challenges of nanotechnology, from the UK Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering. Chapter 5 provides an excellent overview of the potential risks presented by some products of nanotechnology, and is still relevant five years on.

Who should read it? The report was written for the UK government, but you don’t need a degree in science to understand it.  A slightly meatier read than the Nano & Me website.

What I like about it: Informed, authoritative, relevant and readable.

Link: http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm

Risk Assessment of Products of Nanotechnology (SCENIHR)

SCENIHR

What is it? A detailed technical report on the current state of the science on nanotechnology safety from SCENIHR – the European Directorate General for Health and Consumers Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks.

Who should read it? This is a technical document, and will probably be more soporific than stimulating to anyone not steeped in nanotechnology safety research and policy.  But if you can get over this barrier, it contains a wealth of information.  There is also a lay version of the report available online though, that is well worth checking out.

What I like about it: Its depth and relevance.

Link: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_023.pdf [PDF, 500 KB]

Nanotoxicology:  An emerging discipline evolving from studies of ultrafine particles.

Oberdörster, Oberdörster and Oberdörster,

What is it? A review paper on “nanotoxicology” written in 2005 by the father, daughter and son team of Günter, Eva and Jan Oberdörster.

Who should read it? Researchers, regulators, decision makers and anyone else interested in nanoparticle toxicity.  This is an academic review paper, so you probably wouldn’t want to read it if you only had a passing interest in nanotechnology safety.  But for anyone who isn’t scared of a bit of science, it provides an excellent review of the field that is still relevant four years on.

What I like about it: Günter Oberdörster is one of the foremost authorities on nanoparticle toxicity, and this paper expertly sets out the important questions surrounding nanoparticle toxicology.  Highly recommended reading.

Link: http://www.ehponline.org/docs/2005/7339/abstract.html

Nanoparticles, human health hazard and regulation

Seaton et al.

What is it? A recent review paper by Anthony Seaton, Lang Tran, Rob Aitken and Ken Donaldson that provides a unique and highly informative overview of nanoparticle safety from the perspective of the workplace.

Who should read it? Anyone trying to make sense of the possible risks presented by engineered nanoparticles, and how to avoid them.

What I like about it: Well-presented arguments that frame engineered/manufactured nanoparticle risks in the context of what is already known, and what still needs to be known.

Link: http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2009/08/31/rsif.2009.0252.focus.full

Approaches to Safe Nanotechnology: An information exchange with NIOSH

Approaches to Safety Nanotechnology

What is it? A compendium of information on nanotechnology safety in the workplace, from the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

Who should read it? Anyone responsible workplace safety. The report is also a mine of information for readers of all backgrounds who are interested in the safety of engineered nanomaterials.

What I like about it: A comprehensive and periodically updated evaluation of the state of the science on nanomaterial safety, from one of the world’s foremost workplace safety research organizations.

Link: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/safenano/

National Nanotechnology Initiative website

National Nanotechnology Initiative

What is it? The official website of the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI).  The website includes a section on environmental, safety and health aspects of nanotechnology.

Who should read it? Anyone interested in the US government’s take on nanotechnology safety.

What I like about it: It’s a window into what the US government – one of the leading funders of nanotechnology research and development – are doing in this area.

Link: http://www.nano.gov/html/society/EHS.html

International Council On Nanotechnology website

ICON

What is it? A multi-stakeholder organization set up by the Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice University.  For info. on nanotechnology safety, check out the backgrounders, the news feed (also on Twitter) and the ICON blog.

Who should use it? The ICON backgrounders, blog and news feed are relevant to anyone interested in the latest developments in nanotech safety.

What I like about it: Comprehensive news on nanotechnology safety, and background papers that explain complex science in a simple way.

Link: http://icon.rice.edu/

SAFENANO website

SAFENANO

What is it? An information resource on nanotechnology safety, from the UK-based Institute for Occupational Medicine.  A great source of news, analysis and opinions.

Who should use it? Anyone interested in the latest on nanotechnology safety, with a focus on the workplace.

What I like about it: Down to earth information.  I also contribute to the SAFENANO blog though, so I might be biased!

Link: http://www.safenano.org/

2020 Science website

2020 Science

What is it? OK so this is a little self-serving, but I write so much about nanotechnology safety that I thought I should include 2020 Science here.  For a list of nanotech safety-related blogs, check these out, or start off with Ten things everyone should know about nanotechnology safety.

Who should use it? Anyone who wants to find out more about issues around nanotechnology safety.

What I like about it: Mmm, I don’t think I’m the best qualified person to answer that.

Link: http://2020science.org

In restricting myself to ten resources here, I’m sure I have failed to mention many that others would have included.  So if you have a publicly accessible website, paper or other resource on nanotechnology safety you think people would find useful, please do mention it in the comments below.

Update 09/15/09:  Linked screenshots to respective websites

Asked to conclude the Fourth International Conference on Nanotechnology, Occupational and Environmental Health in Helsinki this year, I rather rashly came up with the above title for my talk—thinking that I would find inspiration in the multitude of new research on nanotech safety being presented at the meeting.

As it turns out, events conspired against me and I ended up unavoidably missing most of the conference!

Faced with the tricky task of wrapping up a meeting that I had been embarrassingly absent from, I decided to share a rather more personal perspective on nanotechnology safety—my own reflections on things I think people should know.

This list is far from complete, and is heavily biased towards workplace safety.  And given that it was prepared for a crowd of conference attendees who were most likely maxed out on nano and more interested in where the nearest bar was, it’s a little light on detail.

Nevertheless, it is hopefully interesting and informative, and causes at least one person other than myself to stop and think afresh about how to ensure safety in the face of a new and rapidly developing technology.

So without further ado, and in reverse order, here is my highly subjective list of ten things everyone should know about nanotechnology safety…

10.  There’s no such thing as “nanotechnology safety”

Actually, this isn’t quite true.  Nanotechnology safety is clearly an important and legitimate goal.  It’s just that when you get down to the business of protecting people and the environment, the big idea of “nanotechnology” can become more of a hindrance than a help.

These are just two traps that discussing “nanotechnology safety” can open up:

First, we have the problem of definitions.  If we are going to discuss “nanotechnology safety,” we need to know what we are talking about.  Unfortunately, the generally accepted definition of nanotechnology—“the understanding and control of matter at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications” is what the US National Nanotechnology Initiative uses—is one of expedience, not of science.  It serves the purpose of stimulating new research and technology innovation in an exciting new area brilliantly.  But it doesn’t clearly define a set of products and processes that have common and specific safety issues; and it was never intended to.

As a result, attempts to apply the generally accepted definition of nanotechnology to material and product safety ends up in a messy mismatch.  Materials that are probably benign come under suspicion, while others that we should be worried about potentially slip the net.

Second, there is the problem of generalities.  The products of nanotechnology are infinitely varied; each behaves in a different way and potentially presents a different set of risks.  This is obvious when we think about it.  Comparing the potential benefits and risks of scanning tunneling microscopes, semiconductor chips and smart drugs (for instance) is nonsensical, even though each can legitimately be claimed as a product of nanotechnology.  The trouble is, focusing on “nanotechnology safety” seems to result in rationality by-pass sometimes, leading to the questionable assumption that nanotechnology presents a common set of safety problems, which can be solved by a common suite of safety solutions.

In the extreme, this type of generalization can lead to experiences with one nanotech product being applied to others—safety concerns over titanium dioxide nanoparticles in sunscreens being driven by inhalation studies using carbon nanotubes for instance; or consumers potentially avoiding “nano” branded goods because they heard that “nanotechnology” isn’t “safe.”

Perhaps more to the point though, nanotechnology—like most technologies—is safety-neutral.  It isn’t the technology so much as what is done with it that is important.  Which means that rather than talking about “nanotechnology safety,” it makes a lot more sense to talk about the safe handling, use and disposal of specific materials, products and processes that arise from its application.

9.  We’re living in a post-chemistry world

Having debunked the idea of “nanotechnology safety,” I should really talk about what might be important when it comes to working with and using the products of nanotechnology as safely as possible—because without a doubt, some of its uses will lead to new safety challenges.

One class of products that raises some interesting safety questions is “nanomaterials”—materials engineered at the nanometer-scale so they exhibit scale-specific properties.  These materials are intentionally designed to do what they do because of their physical form, as well as their chemical makeup.  So it seems reasonable to ask whether what they look like at the nanoscale also leads to new safety issues.

Of course, for physical form to be relevant to human health or the environment, the material first has to get to where it can do harm.  For people, this means that chunks of it need to be small enough to be inhaled, ingested, or penetrate through the skin.  No exposure—no harm.

However, for nanomaterials that can get into the body, there will be some cases where their physical form—their size, shape, physical structure—can lead to them being dangerous above certain concentrations.

But here’s the rub.  Over the past fifty plus years, we’ve got used to assessing the likely risks associated with materials by considering their chemistry alone.  As a result we have a bit of a blind spot when it comes to materials that are potentially harmful because of something more than just their chemical composition.

This is a bit of an oversimplification of course.  In the field of occupational health we have had to deal with asbestos and other fibers that cause harm because of their chemistry and their physical form.  And it’s long been recognized that different sized airborne particles present different risks if inhaled.  But these are the exceptions rather than the rule, and there is still a tendency when assessing risks to ignore physical form, or to struggle with what to do with it.

However, as engineered nanomaterials become increasingly sophisticated, this will need to change if we are to work with them safely.  We are living in a post-chemistry world, where functionality and safety depend on more than just what something is made of.  And if we are to ensure the safety of emerging engineered nanomaterials, we need to learn how to survive and thrive in this world.

8.  Current understanding of nanomaterial risks has more holes than a Swiss cheese

So we know that we might need a new perspective on the potential risks associated with engineered nanomaterials and how to manage them.  But here we hit a problem—when it comes to answering questions that seem to be important, there’s a distinct dearth of information.

Quantifying the human health risks (for example) associated with a material—a normal step in ensuring their safe use—requires answers to many questions, including:

• How can the material enter the body?
• Where does it go and how does it change once it gets there?
• What aspects of the material end up causing harm?
• How much material is needed for serious harm to occur?
• How should the toxicity of the material be assessed?
• How will people end up being exposed to the material?
• How should exposure be measured? And
• Can exposures be adequately controlled?

When it comes to new nanomaterials, these are just some of the questions we still don’t have complete answers to.  And they only address occupational exposures.  What happens when these same nanomaterials get out into the environment?

If we are going to get a good handle on working safely with engineered nanomaterials and other products based on nanotechnology, these holes will eventually need to be filled.  And as the diversity and sophistication of engineered nanomaterials continues to grow, research into assessing and managing their possible risks will need to be well funded and strategically targeted if it is to keep up.

7.  Engineered nanomaterials are accomplished shape-shifters

It is probably something of an exaggeration to refer to nanomaterials as shape-shifters, but without a doubt, one of the big challenges of ensuring the safety of engineered nanomaterials is that their behavior changes depending on where they are, and where they’ve been.  A freshly minted nanoparticle may have a surface that is crammed full of highly active chemicals.  Ten minutes later, these chemicals may have lost their potency—with a resulting reduction in the material’s ability to cause harm.  Small particles may agglomerate with others to form large particles over time.  Or large agglomerates may separate out into smaller ones once inhaled.  Particles moving through the air might pick up a coating of other chemicals in their vicinity and, if inhaled, will behave differently to “naked” particles.  Nanoparticles in the lungs or blood may become shrouded in specific biological molecules that dictate where they go and how the body responds.  Nanoparticles may be suspended in liquids, compressed into pellets, or embedded in plastics.  Nanotechnology-enabled products may shed material that changes as it moves through the environment, and moves through the environment differently as it changes.  And nano-products disposed of at the end of their life may once again liberate nanomaterials that bear little resemblance to the stuff they were originally made of.

In short, the qualities that make a nanomaterial potentially harmful change over the material’s lifetime.

This complicates matters when it comes to ensuring safety.  Just because a nanoparticle in a workplace is considered safe, doesn’t mean that it will still be safe several steps down the road.  The converse is also true—a nanomaterial that needs to be handled with care in the workplace may be relatively benign after it has been incorporated into a product.

There are no easy answers to dealing with this shifting risk profile.  But one thing is certain: If engineered nanomaterials are to be used safely, their potential for causing harm, and the means to manage this, needs to be considered across their life cycle.

6.  The technology’s new, but that doesn’t make old safety practices redundant

In the face of a new and, in some cases, radically different technology, there is a temptation for imaginations to go into overdrive and assume that these new technologies automatically demand new safety measures.

Fortunately, even though we are facing a nanotechnology safety future that is complex and riddled with holes, we do have some tricks at our disposal for helping to ensure the safer handling of nanomaterials.

It seems that established occupational hygiene practices go a long way to preventing exposures and reducing risks.  Guidance from the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), BSI, the International Standards Organization (ISO) and others makes it very clear that by taking reasonable precautions with how materials are handled, control measures are established and workers are protected, the chances of something untoward happening are reduced substantially—even if hard data on a new material’s toxicity are lacking.

Undoubtedly there will be situations where conventional practices don’t go all the way to ensuring the safe use of nanomaterials—just one more reason why more research is needed. But we do know that airborne nanoparticles can be removed from the air with conventional local exhaust ventilation systems; that air filters do a good job of reducing exposures; and that bad workplace practices increase the chances of harm occurring, whether the materials being handled are nanoscale or not.

So the good news is that we don’t need to throw out decades of experience with working safely with nanomaterials.

On the other hand, it’s probably not a good idea to be complacent—old tricks may work with new technologies, but probably only up to a point.

And just to be clear, there is a world of difference between safe and safer.

5.  Lower exposures mean lower risks

Continuing the theme of old tricks, reducing risks through controlling exposure does seem to be an area where established wisdom has a role to play with engineered nanomaterials.

As a rule of thumb, lowering exposure levels is likely to reduce potential risks from nanomaterials, even in the absence of hard toxicity data.  With few exceptions, the human health risks of materials tend to follow a general trend of increasing response with increasing dose.  There are subtleties here involving the shape of the relationship between dose and response, the period over which effects occur, how dose is measured and whether a dose exists below which no response is observed.  But these aside, most of our experiences with harmful agents—whether gases, liquids or particles—suggest that less stuff means lower risk.

This is helpful when handling new engineered nanomaterials, because we can be reasonably sure that every step towards lowering exposures is a step in the right direction.  It means that equipped with the most basic exposure control technologies and an instrument capable of measuring some aspect of the nanomaterial concentration, potential risks can be reduced.

But helpful as this approach to reducing risk is, there is a problem: how low is low enough?

4.  Measurement without meaning is like a car without an engine

If you measure the concentration of nanoparticles in a workplace—say you measure the number or mass of particles per cubic meter—what does that measurement mean?  And how can you use it to increase safety without impacting unnecessarily on operating costs?

Exposure measurement is a tricky subject.  Numbers—hard data—can be comforting.  But without a clear idea of their relevance, they can also be misleading. A measurement of airborne nanomaterial concentration can be used to reduce exposure, but how far should it be reduced?  Alternatively, measurements can be used to try and eliminate exposure altogether.  But there’s always that lingering doubt that exposures are occurring below the instrument’s detection threshold.  And rather annoyingly, the lower the concentration of material an instrument will detect, and the harder it will be to get a zero reading.

In other words, measurements without the means to interpret and use them are a bit like a car without an engine—pretty, but useless!

The reality is that without guidance on how to interpret and act on them, measurements can cause more problems than they solve—especially if the cost of reducing exposures to some arbitrary level becomes prohibitively expensive.

What would be helpful here is a benchmark against which exposure measurements can be assessed—a reference that enables measurements to be translated into actions.  Where solid risk-related data are available, these benchmarks are the exposure limits set by governments and other organizations familiar to any occupational hygienist.

But what do you do in the absence of such limits?

One option is to take a stab at estimating reasonable benchmark limits, based on the best available information. For instance, in “Nanotechnologies – Part 2: Guide to safe handling and disposal of manufactured nanomaterials,” BSI has recommended a series of rules –of-thumb, based on reasonably well-understood materials, which help establish working benchmark levels for new and untested materials.  The idea is that in the absence of any better information, exposure limits for analogous materials are used as a starting point.

The methodology is rough and ready, and doesn’t sit well with every expert.  But at least it provides a useful way of assigning meaning to measurements; as long at the working benchmark levels do not become set in stone.

3.  When the data run out – innovate!

This question of measuring exposure in the absence of well-established exposure limits is just one part of a larger issue—how do you make smart safety decisions in the absence of good information?

Even if we can use established practiced to lower risks, we are still faced with a barrow-load of unknowns and uncertainties that pull the rug out from under conventional approaches to quantifying and managing risks.  And even if did manage to fill in all the current knowledge-holes, the chances are that we would be facing a whole new set of uncertainties sooner rather than later.

So what do we do – apart from panic?

The answer is: Innovate! More than ever in the future, we will have to rely on new and innovative approaches to managing risks; ones that enable decisions to be made in the absence of hard data.  Something of this was seen in the observation that lower exposures mean lower risks—a concept that enables risks to be reduced even in the absence of toxicology data.  Yet more inventive approaches will be needed if engineered nanomaterials are to be used safely in a world where a science-based understanding of the risks looks increasingly like a Swiss cheese, no matter how hard we try.

Vladimir Murashov and John Howard recently highlighted some possible innovations in the journal Nature Nanotechnology. Writing on essential features for proactive risk management, they discussed a number of ways to manage risk in a data-deficient world.  In particular, they stressed the need to consider “soft” (or qualitative) approaches to assessing and managing risks such as using expert judgment, and control banding.

These recommendations are a good start.  But much more is needed if we are to learn to make smart choices in the face of uncertainty.

2.  It’s good to talk

The adage “a problem shared is a problem halved” is rather a trite one, but it does contain a grain of truth.  Where companies and workers face difficult challenges in ensuring the safety of their workplaces, drawing on the collective wisdom of the community can be a great boon.

In their article, Murashov and Howard stressed is the need for global stakeholder cooperation in ensuring the safe use of engineered nanomaterials.  This makes perfect sense.  Safety shouldn’t be a competitive issue—it’s in everyone’s interest to share information and experiences that will prevent harm to people or the environment. Information sharing encourages faster, better solutions to challenges. It allows smaller outfits to tap into a wealth of experience and expertise that would otherwise be beyond their reach. And it reduces the chances of competitors making a mess of “nanotechnology safety” in a way that undermines the credibility of the technology as a whole.

The good news is that people are talking—not as much as they should perhaps, but at least the lines of communication are open.  The NanOEH2009 conferences is a great example of information sharing, and there are many more—ISO and OECD initiatives for instance, and the work of the International Council On Nanotechnology.

But I wanted to highlight one initiative in particular, in part because I had a small hand in the initial idea, but mainly because I think it has great potential to get the global nanotechnology safety community working together to find solutions to the challenges they face.  And that is the Good Nano Guide.

Designed as a community forum and resource, this is developing into an important place for learning about other people’s experiences of working safely with nanomaterials, and for sharing your own.  As people begin to contribute to it and use it, it could turn into an open-access goldmine for know-how on working as safely as possible with engineered nanomaterials.

1.  People matter

And finally my number one thing that everyone should know about nanotechnology safety—people matter.

This may seem simple, or obvious, but it’s something that can get left out of the equation all too easily.

At the end of the day, human risk research is about protecting people from injury, disease and death, and ensuring a high quality of life.  It isn’t about the buzz of new discovery.  It isn’t about getting rich and famous.  It isn’t about making a profit.  And it isn’t about sustaining ideologies.

All of these have their place, and in many cases are good and important.  But the primary focus of risk research should be the people it ultimately impacts.

This is part of the culture of risk-based research professionals who have come up through schools of public health, government research labs and similar institutions.  It may get buried at times.  But generally there is that recognition that the rewards of the work are more safe and healthy people, and fewer injuries, diseases and deaths.

(It goes without saying that a similar ethos exists for environmental risk research)

But when it comes to nanotechnology risk research, I am concerned by the influx of researchers and decision-makers into the field that don’t come from this culture of focusing on people’s health and safety.

This is a very personal perspective, and I may be wrong.  But it seems that with increasing interest in, and funding available, for nanotechnology-related risk research, there has been a shift in emphasis away from traditional risk-research experts and towards researchers with primary expertise in other areas—chemistry, materials science and drug development for example.

This isn’t necessarily a bad thing.  But it does mean that research programs, strategies and policies are increasingly being influenced by people who lack a professional cultural bias toward focusing on the individuals their work and decisions will affect.

That is not to imply that these people do not care—in many cases, they clearly do.  But without that ingrained culture of putting others first, I wonder whether there is a danger of nanotechnology risk research being driven more by political expediency and the promise of economic gain, and less by the need to protect people.

If this isn’t the case, I am willing to stand corrected.  But if it is, we need to work out how to get people back at the center of the nano-risk enterprise.  This may need some careful thought over where research funding goes and how strategic research decisions are made.   But I suspect it will also rely on the willingness of the emerging nanotechnology safety community to rethink and reaffirm its values.

At the end of the day, despite the clear economic and social justifications, getting nanotechnology “right” will be a hollow achievement if we end up neglecting the very people who will make its success possible.  Let’s hope we don’t.

A new study about to be published in the European Respiratory Journal links workplace nanoparticle exposure to seven cases of serious and progressive lung disease in China – leading to two patient deaths – and presses a number of “hot” buttons when it comes to the safety of emerging nanotechnologies. To help place the study in context, I have posted separately the following pieces on 2020 Science, and also on the SAFENANO blog:

Nanoparticle exposure and occupational lung disease – six expert perspectives on a new clinical study
Observations from six leading experts on the study, and it’s significance

Is nanotechnology posed for the ride of its life?
A caution against overlooking the study’s true relevance in the rush to use it to justify pre-existing positions on nanotechnology

Further links to useful resources are included at the end of this blog.

Study Overview

In brief, the paper by Song et al. that appears in the European Respiratory Journal is a clinical study of 7 female Chinese workers who were diagnosed with unusual and progressive lung damage. Two of the women died as a result of the damage. All had been working for some months in a facility spraying a polyacrylic ester paste onto a polystyrene substrate that was subsequently heat-cured. The work was carried out in an enclosed space with little natural ventilation. Five months before the lung disease was identified, the local exhaust ventilation in the facility broke down – and from the account given was never mended.

All seven patients were suffering from shortness of breath, and pleural effusions (an excess of liquid in the cavity surrounding the lungs).  Lung tissue samples showed non-specific inflammation, pulmonary fibrosis, and foreign-body granulomas of the pleura – the membrane surrounding the lungs.  Five of the patients were found to have pericardial effusions – an excess of liquid around the heart.

On examination, investigators found ~30 nm diameter particles in fluid surrounding the lungs of the patients, and in the cytoplasm and nucleoplasm of cells lining the inside and outside of the patients’ lungs. They also found evidence of similar sized nanoparticles in the polyacrylic ester paste, and in the (defunct) workplace ventilation system. There were accounts of smoke being produced as the coated polystyrene was heat-cured.

Based on the presence of the nanoparticles in the workplace and the patients, the nature of the disease observed and previously published cell culture and animal exposure studies on the impacts of nanoparticles, the authors speculated that the lung disease – and the two deaths – were a direct result of the nanoparticle exposure. They conclude that

this may be the first study on the clinical toxicity in humans due to long-term exposure to nanoparticles, and so many questions need to be answered, more studies on the possible mechanisms, diagnosis, treatment and prevention of the ‘nano material-related disease’ are needed. These cases arouse concern that long-term exposure to some nanoparticles without protective measures may be related to serious damage to human lungs. It is impossible to remove nanoparticles that have penetrated the cell and lodged in the cytoplasm and caryoplasm of pulmonary epithelial cells, or that have aggregated around the red blood cell membrane.

In the press release accompanying the paper from the European Respiratory Journal, more explicit associations with the safety of nanotechnology are drawn:

While nanoparticles’ diminutive size means they have unprecedented physical properties (such as diffusion, resistance or flexibility of use) that are invaluable in industrial applications, it also raises the question of their toxicity for consumers and the workforce. Their tiny diameter means that they can penetrate the body’s natural barriers, particularly through contact with damaged skin or by inhalation or ingestion. Moreover, their toxicity has already been established in animals: mice were found to develop symptoms of inflammation and pulmonary fibrosis following application of carbon nanoparticles to the trachea. But until now no cases had been reported in humans. The revelations to be published in the ERJ by a Beijing team will thus break new ground and relaunch the debate on the dangers of nanotechnologies.

Given the buttons this paper and the associated press release hit – including nanoparticle safety, worker deaths and (in the press release) parallels with asbestos, this is a paper that could garner a lot of attention. I suspect that it will refocus attention on what is and isn’t known about the safe use of nanomaterials. Even though the logic is suspect from a purely scientific perspective, the two deaths and their association with nanoparticle exposure will most likely lead to some tough questions being asked by consumers and others on the safety of other nanomaterials. This may not be a bad thing, but at the same time it is important to understand the limitations of the study:

This is a clinical study and not a toxicology study: The investigators did not have the luxury of conducting controlled and well-designed experiments, but were placed in the position of detectives piecing together a series of events after the fact.  Inevitably, this leaves gaps in the information presented, but does not necessarily detract from the usefulness of the study.

The paper adds to the general knowledge base of how nanoparticle exposures might impact on human health. In this respect, it is an important addition to the literature.However, in isolation it tells us very little beyond this particular incident, and great care should be taken in extrapolating the findings to the handling of nanoparticles in general.  It is not possible to draw any general conclusions on the safe use of nanotechnologies from the study.

Interpretation of the study is hampered by a lack of exposure data. Nothing concrete is known about the nature or magnitude of the workplace exposures. It can be speculated (reasonably up to a point) that the workers were exposed to high airborne concentrations of a cocktail of materials that probably contained nanometer-scale particles in some form. What is not known is what the particles were made of of, whether they were inhaled as single particles or as large agglomerates or aggregates, or whether there was anything unusual about their surface–including the presence of adsorbed chemicals.  All of these pieces of information are important in making sense of the health effects seen.

There are no electron microscope images of the nanoparticles found in the workplace. The researchers note the presence of ~30 nm particles in the polyacrylate paste and the ventilation system.  But without images, this information isn’t much help in working out whether the presence of these particles was significant.

There is no chemical analysis of the particles found in the workplace or biological samples. This is a critical data gap – the information is needed to link the workplace material to the material found in the patients, and to establish whether these were polyacrylic particles, an inorganic additive to the paste, or something else.

There is no assessment of other plausible causes of the symptoms seen. The authors are quick to dismiss other possible causes (such as other fumes and vapors from the polyacrylic paste or the polystyrene substrate) and focus in on the nanoparticles.  But without further research, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of other factors playing a role here.

In discussing the relevance of the study, no distinction is made between different types of nanomaterials and their potential impacts. The authors cite the in vitro and in vivo behavior of a range of nanomaterials observed in previous studies and relate these findings to their own observations,.  But they fail to recognize that different nanoparticles behave in very different ways.  For instance, they refer to lung damage associated with inhaling carbon nanotubes in animals as being similar to some of the symptoms observed in their patients, without acknowledging that the particles they observe bear no resemblance to carbon nanotubes.   As a result, the authors propagate the idea that nanoparticles are a generic class of material – which research suggests they are not.

Despite these limitations, this is a strong clinical study, and if viewed appropriately, will most likely help avoid similar incidents in the future.

And as a final observation, it is worth noting that the illnesses and deaths observed would most likely not have occurred if long-accepted occupational practices had been followed.  The tragedy here is that, irrespective of the presence of nanoparticles, the illnesses and deaths could have been prevented if simple steps had been taken to reduce exposures.

Additional resources:

GoodNanoGuide
A community resource for working safely with engineered nanomaterials

SAFENANO
Further information on the Song study

ICON Blog
Further comments and reflections on the study from ICON

[8/20/09: link to paper updated]

The recent tragic account of seven Chinese workers suffering—apparently—from nanoparticle-induced lung disease, is likely to raise serious concerns with anyone potentially exposed to similar particles.  Yet without the benefit of insight from scientists and others working on nanoparticles and their potential health impacts, it’s hard to get a handle on the study’s broader relevance.

When I first found out about the study, I asked six highly regarded experts familiar with the issues to share their thoughts on the work and its broader implications.  Their comments (below) reflect a range of perspectives and opinions, and hopefully provide a deeper insight into an important but far from conclusive piece of research…

[More information on this study and its relevance can be found here]

Professor Anthony Seaton MD

Professor Seaton is a distinguished clinical physician specializing in occupational health, and a highly regarded expert on the potential impacts of inhaling airborne nanoparticles. He is currently emeritus professor in the Department of Environmental and Occupational Medicine at the University of Aberdeen.

Although this paper has weaknesses, it contains a number of important messages. Essentially it is tragic story of a fatal industrial accident, from the rather sparse description in the text, consequent upon grossly inadequate health and safety measures in a workplace. A small number of unsophisticated young women and one man were exposed to a toxic mixture of dust and fumes in a small unventilated room and developed a progressive lung condition that has so far killed two of them and seriously disabled most. Similar episodes, almost always involving gases, have occurred in the past, but this one has unique features, notably the effect in causing effusion of fluid into the linings of the lung (the pleura) and heart (the pericardium), the finding of nanoparticles in the workplace and in the lungs and lung fluid of the workers, and the finding of a tissue reaction to particles in the lung lining. Most unfortunately, the authors were unable to obtain or report information on the chemical nature of the particles in the lungs or the workplace. While it remains an open question how far the illnesses reported were due to particles and how far to gases, it is my view that an important component must have been due to particles.

But… the messages:

1. It is not always known that a fume, by definition, comprises nanoparticles generated by heating. This process involved not only spraying of a powder but also heating of a plastic material and fume would undoubtedly have been produced (the authors describe “smoke”).
2. Heating of plastics will produce any number of organic chemicals in particulate and gaseous form, depending on temperature and the chemistry of the plastic. Many of these are very toxic to the lung.
3. In such circumstances, if the particles produced are insoluble, they are likely to be retained in the lung and other tissues. If also they have toxic surfaces, tissue reactions will occur, as apparently in this case.
4. Such dreadful episodes can be prevented (and generally are prevented) by well-established occupational hygiene measures. Those who decry the attitude of governments in the West to “Health and Safety” need to be aware that our attitude results from many similar experiences throughout our own industrial revolution and even occasionally nowadays.

So to me the message of this episode is that fumes and dusts are often toxic and if you ignore this, tragedies like this may occur. Appropriate workplace hygiene will prevent this in the nanotechnology industry as elsewhere. Please take note, and let’s not argue about whether this paper’s conclusions are right or wrong – that is not the message.

Professor Günter Oberdörster

Professor Oberdörster is considered by many to be the “father” of research into the toxicology of inhaled nanoparticles.  His group at the University of Rochester has led global research in this area for over two decades.

This is clearly a case of a very complex exposure to a lethal mixture of reactive gases and particles of different chemistry and sizes, including nano-sized particles. But, even more importantly, this is a case of a tragic accident with fatal outcome due to extremely poor industrial hygiene conditions.  To blame the resulting severe pathology and fatalities categorically on “nanoparticles” that were present in a paint paste is scientifically unjustified.  There are a number of potential mechanisms that may have been at play, including the formation of highly reactive gas phase polymer compounds generated by the heating of the spray painted styrene boards combined with immediate formation of condensation aerosols of ultrafine particles (fume) of different larger agglomeration and aggregation states (smoke was visible).  Such freshly heat-generated condensation aerosols can cause highly toxic acute effects. Well known examples include metal fume fever and polymer fume fever, which are generally of a short-lasting nature, but fatalities have been reported following polymer fume exposures.  Fume exposures can also result in an adaptive state and thereby protect the organism from untoward effects of subsequent exposures, which has been described already in the early part of the last century in human zinc metal fume exposed workers (could this explain the many months long exposure duration, until it was too late for the Chinese workers?). Even seemingly harmless actions such as heating ski wax onto ski surfaces has resulted in severe ARDS [Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome]-like effects due to inhalation of the generated fumes, requiring hospitalization. Thus, fumes of freshly-generated thermodegradation products are clearly a well-recognized occupational hazard, as well as a potential hazard to consumers (e.g., exposure to fumes from heated PTFE in household cooking and other appliances).

In the tragic industrial accident in the Chinese factory reported here, the paint paste was described as a mix of many organic components that contained additionally nanoparticles of polyacrylate (~30nm) as did the collected dust, but neither detailed characterization nor pictures are provided. Are they identical to the nanoparticles found in fluids and tissues of the patients? Unfortunately, there is a complete lack of the characterization of the nanoparticles found in the effusion fluids and lung tissue, and no attempt was made to compare these to those contained in the paint and dust. Conceivably, when inhaled they could act as carriers of reactive gas phase constituents, or otherwise they could just signal a breakdown of epithelial barriers in the lung, which increased their biodistribution to interstitial, pleural and other sites where they were found, if indeed they were the same. Thus, the question:  “Did polyacrylate nanoparticles cause, or contribute to the cause of, the observed severe pathology, or are they just ‘passive bystanders’ in this complex mixed exposure scenario?” cannot be answered.  We simply do not know, but what is obvious is that proper industrial hygiene would have prevented such a horrific accident.  Given this clear message it is not obvious why the authors identify a need for “more studies on … prevention of the ‘nanomaterial related disease’ “. No, we do not need more studies on how to prevent future accidents like this one, just proper well-established common sense industrial hygiene measures will do that. And yes, we need to identify hazardous nanomaterials and the characteristics that make them hazardous; key is, however, to use readily available preventive measures to monitor and avoid exposure until we know better and are able to set scientifically founded safe exposure limits.

This case should not be used to bedevil nanotechnology, and a conclusion that nanoparticles generically are to blame is very unfortunate.  Because of this, the paper is likely to make a big splash in the media. It is important that terrible incidents like this be published, despite the lack of rigorous scientific analysis that should have been included. Such accidents serve as warnings and grim reminders of the need for workers’ protection, whether exposure to nanomaterials is involved or not. Indeed, earlier incidents of severe cases of organising pneumonia including fibrosis resulting in six fatalities in textile paint spraying operations occurred in the early 1990′s in Spain (long before the awareness of media and scientists for “nano”). It should have been a strong message for the necessity of precautionary protective measures in paint spraying industrial applications.

Professor Ken Donaldson

A toxicologist specializing in workplace lung diseases, Professor Donaldson is one of the world’s leading authorities on the health impacts of inhaling airborne nanoparticles.  His group at the University of Edinburgh has conducted extensive research into the potential health impacts of inhaling nanomaterials.

This is a puzzling case. There is no conventional particle exposure that does this kind of damage to the lungs. Not even long-term exposure to high levels of the most toxic dusts known. Even when asbestos affects the pleura it takes tens of years of exposure. In the past there was a report of a highly toxic, hot Teflon particle exposure from overheated frying pans where the particles had highly toxic free radicals on their surface that disappeared rapidly with time; that is a possibility here. The damaging exposure was clearly a toxic cocktail of particles and chemicals and so is a highly unusual case that sheds little light on the hazards from the vast majority of nanoparticles used in workplaces, which do not have a reactive surface. It may yet turn out that the particles are a by-product of the chemical reaction and not the main cause of the injury.  If a very toxic chemical exposure involves the formation of nanoparticles as part of its chemistry, which is quite possible, they may not necessarily be the main toxin; they could be just an epiphenomenon. I notice that the cell that was stuffed with particles seemed to be alive and well.

Chemical exposures in the past might have produced nanoparticles but since no-one looked for them they may never have been implicated. In the current climate of concern over nanoparticles the reverse is true and there may be a rush to judgement implicating the nanoparticles in the adverse effects. I think the paper should never have been published without characterising the exposure and the toxicological reactivity of the nanoparticles before blaming the effects on them. If the effects were due to highly toxic short-lived free radicals on the particle surfaces then it informs a tiny sub-division of nanoparticles that really represent a chemical exposure and certainly no member of the public would ever get a substantial exposure to this material. A well-regulated workplace with proper controls would have prevented this accident. Therefore the paper by Song et al. demonstrates a failure of occupational hygiene and worker protection in the chemical industry, that happened to have involve nanoparticles, rather than a helpful insight into nanoparticle toxicology.

Professor Vicki Stone

Editor of the journal Nanotoxicology and a professor of toxicology at Napier University in Edinburgh, Professor Stone is a foremost expert on the mechanisms by which nanoparticles potentially interact with the body and cause harm.

The publication by Song et al. claims to have identified evidence that nanoparticles can cause adverse health effects, specifically on the lungs of women employed in a poorly ventilated working environment.  Unfortunately the publication contains a number of flaws, which make this conclusion hard to believe or confirm.  Firstly, the cocktail of chemicals and particles to which the women were exposed was very complex, containing many substances which are potentially toxic.  This cocktail was poorly understood as the authors were unable to sample and analyse the actual cocktail mixture directly to determine the real composition.  This is often a problem with studies of this type, but usually authors would acknowledge the limitations that this lack of information imposes when trying to draw conclusions.  These authors do not seem to have fully appreciated these limitations causing them to jump to conclusions.

The authors also showed some interesting pictures of particles within the lungs of these women.  However, they did not provide any evidence to show that these particles were derived from the working environment – this could have been achieved through microscopes that can analyse the particle chemical composition.  Humans constantly inhale particles from a wide variety of sources, including traffic, domestic and industrial pollution.  It is therefore important to confirm that these particles were gained specifically from the working environment before the fumes associated with their employment can be blamed for the health effects observed.

Therefore, at this time, this paper does not effectively illustrate adverse clinical effects of nanoparticles in a worker population, but it does raise the issue that we need to be careful and vigilant in future.

Dr. Rob Aitken

Director of Strategic Consulting at the Institute of Occupational Medicine in Edinburgh and director of the SAFENANO initiative, Dr. Aitken has a wealth of experience addressing workplace safety and health.  He is a leading international expert in developing safe practices for working with engineered nanomaterials—including nanoparticles.

This tragic event is a shocking example of what can go wrong if a proper care is not taken with basic industrial hygiene. There can be little doubt that these serious health effects have been caused as a result of a workplace exposure. The workplace, where a complex mixture of chemicals was being sprayed, and heating activities producing smoke being carried out, in an closed room with no effective ventilation and entirely inappropriate personal protective equipment seems inexcusable.

However, the key question which remains unanswered at this time is “exposure to what?” The exposure assessment in the study is poorly described. It seems from the information provided that these unfortunate workers were handling a paste composed of a complex mixture including butanoic acid, butyl ester, N-butyl ether, acetic acid, toluene, di-tert-butyl peroxide,1- butanol, acetic acid ethenyl ester, isopropyl alcohol and ethylene dioxide and finally some type of nanoparticle,  30 nm in diameter. Although the authors describe the nanoparticles found as being polyacrylate, the characterisation within the study provides no clear information about either the nanoparticles’ composition or their quantity within the paint paste. The nanoparticles seem to have been found in the dust in the air but again no indication of the airborne concentration, or the proportion of the mass attributable to them.  Likewise, the same nanoparticles seem to have been found in the biological samples, but again there is no indication or estimation of in what quantity.

On the evidence presented is not possible to say with any certainty that the nanoparticles in question caused the effects, and I suspect that on this basis alone the paper will be quickly dismissed by scientific communities.  However neither is it possible to say that they are not responsible, and the alarm that such a paper is capable of raising amongst a broader audience is not to be taken lightly.

There are some parallels with earlier scares, most notably the infamous “magic nano” incident. Where the Chinese incident seems to be different is that there really are nanoparticles here, albeit of apparently unknown composition. However, just like the earlier event, it is not enough to point the finger of blame at other possible culprits, the seriousness of this event demands further investigation, no matter how difficult that is.

Was this event caused by exposure to some type of nanoparticles? I don’t know, but it would certainly be ill advised to be too quick to dismiss the possibility.

Dr. Kristen Kulinowski

Dr. Kulinowski is Director of the International Council On Nanotechnology (ICON) at Rice University, and a global leader in developing safe and responsible nanotechnologies.  Under her direction, ICON has established the foremost on-line database of nanotechnology health and environmental impact research papers, and the GoodNanoGuide—an initiative to enable people share and develop the best possible practices for working safely with engineered nanomaterials.

I was impressed by the exhaustive clinical detail presented by the physicians to support their case that exposures in the workplace resulted in harm to these women. What I would have liked to see is more analysis of the particles themselves and how they were produced. What are the particles made of? Is there any corresponding toxicity literature investigating the same particle types in animal models? Were the particles part of the paste or created by the spraying or drying process? Not clear.

It’s also not clear if the answers to those questions really inform the lessons we might draw from this incident. Whether these were incidental or manufactured nanoparticles is somewhat beside the point. The real tragedy here is that these workers could have been protected if a conventional chemical hygiene plan had been implemented that included a working ventilation system and personal protective equipment. Preventing inhalation of 30-nm nanoparticles can be as simple as the proper use of an inexpensive mask sold by your neighborhood home improvement store. But even this basic protective measure was not employed in this workplace.

We can do better than this. A lot better. The tools are out there; it’s up to us to use them.

(Kristen has posted further comments on the new study on the ICON blog)

In the wake of a new study linking “nanotechnology” to two deaths and five additional cases of lung disease, the emerging technology of the ultra-small could be in for a rough ride.  Yet the real risk is that in the rush to use or even abuse the findings, the science and it’s true relevance are overlooked.

It’s never good news when a new technology is associated with a death.

The emerging area of nanotechnology has had a fairly smooth ride so far.  Sure, there have been questions over possible new health risks associated with some of its more esoteric offerings.  But no one has actually got sick from the technology.

Until now it seems…

A new study to be published in the European Respiratory Journal describes seven cases of unusual and progressive lung disease and two deaths amongst workers at a Chinese factory, and pins the likely cause on nanoparticles—which the authors link inextricably with nanotechnology.

The study presses a number of emotional and political buttons that are likely to elevate its significance—workers died; a new class of material, already under suspicion, is implicated; and in the journal’s press release, parallels are drawn with asbestos—a material that continues to be associated with tens of thousands of deaths around the world each year.

As news coverage surrounding the study gathers momentum, there will be the temptation for opponents and proponents of nanotechnology to either parade it as proof of nanotech’s dangers, or to dismiss it as ill-conceived, flawed and irrelevant.  But either approach would be a serious mistake, and in the long term could jeopardize the safe, successful and beneficial development of nanotechnology.

For years it’s been speculated that nanotechnology-derived materials—including nanoparticles—could present new health risks.  Some materials begin to exhibit novel physical and chemical properties at the nanoscale.  Nanometer-sized particles can get to places inaccessible to larger particles.  And particle size, shape and surface area have been linked to unusual biological behavior for some materials.  Backed by an increasing number of lab studies, it’s becoming increasingly clear that the potential health impact of some nanomaterials depends on more than just chemistry.

But hard data on any actual risks associated with nanomaterials remain tantalizingly elusive.  More to the point, no one has knowingly got sick after being exposed to an engineered nanomaterial yet.  And while proactively avoiding potential nanomaterial-related risks sounds awfully laudable, industry and governments are notoriously loath to take serious action on avoiding possible dangers in the absence of actual bodies.

This presents groups advocating proactive risk management or a precautionary approach to emerging technologies with a dilemma—how do you convince decision-makers to take action before people fall ill, rather than in response to a tragedy?  To some of these groups, this new study could well be seen as just the leverage they need to press for more risk research, stronger regulation, and less rapid nanotechnology commercialization.

On the other hand, industries and governments have a vested interest in ensuring the tens of billions of dollars they have invested in nanotechnology turns a profit—financially, politically and socially.  I may be being over-cynical here, but I can’t see them passively sitting by while a study associating nanotechnology with lung disease threatens to undermine this investment.  At the very least, the scientific integrity of the new study will be examined minutely.  And if it is found wanting, the temptation will be to dismiss it as flawed and irrelevant.

Unfortunately, neither of these approaches will help avoid similar incidents occurring in the future, or support the development of safe nanotechnologies in the long run.

This new study adds to a growing body of research into the potential health impacts of nanoparticles.  Eventually, it will no doubt play a role in helping to understand and avoid the potential dangers associated with some nanomaterials under some conditions. But on its own, it is limited and incomplete.  At the end of the day, the study says little about the potential hazards of nanoparticles in general, and next to nothing about the possible dangers of nanotechnology.  If the sad deaths of the two workers and the lung disease of their five colleagues were used to press home a preordained nanotechnology agenda, it would amount to little more than a cynical misuse of the data—not a move that is likely to encourage evidence-based decisions on either workplace safety or safe nanotechnology.

Yet to dismiss the study as flawed and irrelevant would be equally foolish.  The reality is that two workers died and nanoparticles were implicated, at a time when increasing numbers of nanoparticle-containing products are entering the market.  As the details of the study become known, people are going to want to know what the findings mean for them—whether there are risks associated with emerging nanotechnologies, and what government and industry are doing about it.  If nanotech-promoters downplay or even discredit the work, the move is more likely to engender suspicion than allay fears in many quarters.  And once again, evidence-based decision-making will be in danger of being sacrificed in favor of maintaining a set agenda.

Fortunately, there is a middle way; one that hopefully the proponents and opponents of nanotechnology—and all those in between—will take.  And this is to be science-grounded yet socially responsive in how the study is assessed and acted upon.

This is not a perfect study.  There are key pieces of information missing that prevent its application to nanoparticles more generally.  Yet I believe the questions it raises on the safe development of nanotechnology transcend its limitations.  The study places emerging nanotechnologies in the spotlight, and forces consumers, developers and decision-makers to think afresh about how they might be used safely.  Irrespective of the circumstances surrounding the tragic illnesses and deaths reported, the study will prompt people to ask how safe they are while working with and using products based on nanotechnology.

And where there are no satisfactory answers, these same people are going to want to know why.

Posturing in response to the study will only alienate people and hamper progress towards the science-informed development of safe and beneficial nanotechnology.  Rather, this is a chance for everyone with an interest in safe and beneficial nanotechnologies start working together towards science-grounded progress that ultimately serves everyone’s needs.

Talking together about the way forward is a good start, but to be effective it must lead to informed actions. Given the current lack of knowledge on the potential risks of some nanomaterials, these will depend on well-funded, strategic research that addresses the many existing information gaps.  While this new knowledge is being generated—a process that could take decades—innovative new approaches will be needed for working with and using the products of nanotechnology as safely as possible.  And to cap it all, decision-makers—from manufacturers to workers to policy-makers to consumers—will need access to clear, relevant and understandable information on nanotechnologies, and what they mean to them.

Working together along these lines, the groundwork will be laid for making progress that is based on the best possible science, yet doesn’t ignore the concerns and aspirations of the people it touches.

Tragically, the lung damage experienced by the seven Chinese workers in the European Respiratory Journal study could most likely have been prevented if accepted occupational hygiene practices had been followed. Ultimately, this is a story of a human failing, not an emerging technology.  Yet it does stimulate important questions that will need addressing if the long-term benefits of nanotechnology are to be realized.  The question is, are we prepared to put aside preconceived notions and work together to find effective answers?  I hope we are.

How many good nanotech videos have you come across?  Chances are, you’ll be struggling to name more than one of two.  But over the past few weeks there have been a few posted on the web that are worth watching.  These three in particular mesh together rather nicely to tell a story of nanotechnology’s potential, some of the hurdles that need to be overcome to make it work, and one or two of the myths that have messed around with people’s perceptions.

The first two feature footage of me in conversation with Jorge Ribas at the Discovery Channel, but don’t let that put you off – Jorge did a fantastic job of editing the conversation into something worth watching.  The third is a deliciously wicked cartoon from Ransom Riggs that has already done the Web circuit, but is well worth airing again.

THE GOOD STUFF

A glimpse into some of the cool stuff that could come about through engineering matter at a nanometer scale:

THE “BAD” STUFF

Actually, this isn’t bad at all, but video does give a glimpse into some of the challenges we face if nanotechnology is to reach it’s potential without causing unnecessary harm:

AND THE WEIRD STUFF

I thought this cartoon from Ransom Riggs was a great foil to the first two videos, as it lampoons one of the persistent myths of nanotechnology – the idea of a “gray goo” of self-replicating nanobots destroying the world.  Crazy as the idea sounds, it was Prince Charles’ concerns over gray goo that led to the UK Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering publishing what is still one of the most authoritative assessments of nanotechnology benefits and risks.

All in all, a great introduction to the promise, hurdles and outright myths of nanotechnology.

If you have other favorite nanotech videos, please let me know.

Amidst the cacophony of debate swirling around the true meaning of nanotechnology, I head a voice or reason last week.  The voice was that of Dr. Bernd Sachweh of BASF, speaking at the European Aerosol Conference in Thessoloniki.

I paraphrase, but the essence of Bernd’s point was this:

‘Nano’ is not a thing or a product.  It has no intrinsic value.  Rather, ‘nano’ adds value; it changes the properties and the worth of something that already exists.

I must confess, I rather like the idea of ‘nano’ as adding value, rather than being an entity in and of itself.  It’s hard to come up with of an example where engineering something at the nanoscale leads to behaviour or functionality that is independent of the starting material.  Rather, the great potential of nanotechnology would seem to be in taking raw materials and engineering them in ways that lead to the emergence of novel scale-related properties, which can then be used in new and innovative ways. 

But what I really like about the concept of added-value is that it provides insight into how nanotechnology might be approached from an oversight perspective.  

Just as ‘nano’ adds value to products and processes, it can also be seen as changing the potential of something to cause harm; an “added-risk” to counterbalance the “added-value.”

As soon as ‘nano’ is seen in terms of both added-value and added-risk, it becomes easier to think through some of the more knotty questions associated with using nanomaterials and nano-products safely.  

First off is the question of whether all products of nanotechnology are uniquely harmful.  

Unique nanoscale-related functionality features in many definitions of nanotechnology—this is where the added value comes from.  And it is often assumed that this unique functionality will always equate to unique risks.  Yet unlike added-value, added-risk is not intentionally built into the products of nanotechnology.  Rather, it is a by-product of the technology.  

As a result, added-risk may be significant in some cases, while in others it may be negligible.  It is even conceivable that engineering a material at the nanoscale could reduce the risk it presents to human health and the environment—leading to negative added-risk.  From an oversight perspective, functionality and potential to cause harm sometimes need to be disentangled—something that the concepts of added-value and added-risk might help to achieve.

Following this line of thought, effective nanotechnology oversight will depend on identifying whether engineering a material at the nanoscale results in added-risk.  And implementing such oversight will mean identifying, measuring and controlling those aspects of a new product or material that add to the risk—whether they are related to particle size, material surface area, surface chemistry, or other nano-relevant characteristics. 

But does nanotechnology demand a brand new set of regulations, or can the existing ones cope?  Where existing regulations work for conventional materials and products, the concept of added-risk would seem to support developing new rules on applying current regs to nanotech materials and products, rather than formulating a new set of nanotechnology regulations.  After all, if ‘nano’ has no intrinsic value or risk, what will a brand new set of regulations actually regulate?

The caveat here of course is that the existing regulations need to be sufficiently robust yet flexible to address the added-risk that some nanotechnology applications will embody.  And the evidence is that this isn’t the case for every material or product out there! (See for instance, “Managing the effects of Nanotechnology” by J. Clarence Davies)

Sticking with existing regulations, the concept of added-risk is useful when it comes to defining what is ‘nano’ and what is not from an oversight perspective.  

If the aim is for regulations (in the broadest sense) to address the added-risk rather than the added-value of nanotech materials and products, should definitions of nanotechnology be used that emphasize added-value?  Probably not.  Definitions that depend on the uniqueness and “added-value” of nanotechnology are great for guiding and inspiring research and investment that will lead to new nanotechnology-based products.  But where they do not embody the concept of “added-risk,” they are at best inadequate and at worst seriously misleading when it comes to ensuring the safety of new nanotechnologies.  For instance, gold nanoparticles can bring significant added-value to products when incorporated into heterogeneous catalysts, but if release and exposure are low, added-risk is likely to be minimal.  On the other hand, reducing the size of silver particles to 20 nanometers brings only marginal added-value from a nanotechnology perspective (the physical and chemical properties of the silver do not alter appreciably from the bulk material at this size), yet the increased possibility for release, dispersion and exposure most likely leads to significant added-risk in some cases.

For regulatory purposes, something else is needed—a point hammered home by Mike Taylor in his 2006 assessment of the US Food and Drug Administration’s ability to regulate the products of nanotechnology.  In this respect, it would be far more useful to have a definition of nanotechnology that incorporates the idea that nanoscale engineering can lead to significant changes in the potential risks associated with a material.  Something like: 

For regulatory and oversight purposes, nanotechnology is the control of matter at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 nm, where the behaviour of the resulting material or product differs sufficiently from the component materials to lead to significant changes in potential risks to human health and the environment.

This is a definition that is based on added-risk, not added-value.  And unlike the more commonly used definitions of nanotechnology, it would encompass engineered nanomaterials where the predominant change in moving from the macroscale (or molecular scale) to the nanoscale is an increased potential for release, transport, accumulation, exposure dose, and biological impact.  

Developing an added-risk based definition along these lines (and this is just an example of what a definition might look like) would include a broad range of materials and products that have an altered risk profile because of how they have been engineered; not just those that lie within the somewhat artificial boundaries of 1 to 100 nm.  In effect, there would be no more need for lengthy arguments about whether a 99 nm particle is a nanoparticle for regulatory purposes but a 101 is not; or whether large molecules should be treated as nanomaterials.  Under such a definition, the determiner of relevance would be added-risk, NOT size.

This all sounds great.  But I do have one niggling concern about this idea of added-risk.  And that is how will it apply to the more esoteric products of nanotechnology that are coming along—the increasingly complex second, third and even fourth generation materials that have multiple components, multiple functionalities, and can respond and adapt to their environments and other stimuli.  Here we are moving from adding value to existing materials and technologies, to building brand new materials and technologies.  Will we still be able to think of oversight in terms of added-risk, or will we need to go back to the drawing board?  

That’s a tricky one and I’m not sure the answer is clear yet.  But given the current rate of progress being made in nanotechnology, we could do with some answers sooner rather than later.  In the meantime, seeing nanotechnology in terms of the added-value and added-risk it brings to materials, processes and products might just help deal with the nanotech which is out there now.

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This post first appeared on the SAFENANO blog in September 2008

As the rate of technological progress advances, are we learning the lessons of past successes and failures?  And are we applying these lessons successfully to nanotechnology? 

In 2001, the European Environment Agency (EEA) published a seminal report on developing emerging technologies responsibly.  Through a series of fourteen case studies spanning the past century, a panel led by the late Poul Harremoës examined what has gone right and what has gone wrong with the introduction of past technologies, and what can be learned about introducing new technologies as safely and as successfully as possible.  

The resulting report, “Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000” (PDF, 1.7 MB) draws twelve “late lessons” for decision-makers faced with addressing emerging technologies [1].

Although the report was written before nanotechnology hit the big-time, the twelve lessons (listed below) resonate strongly with the challenges of fostering innovative yet responsible nanotechnologies.  So much so in fact a new commentary just published on-line in the journal Nature Nanotechnology takes a hard look at how nanotech measures up to the report’s findings.  

“Late lessons from early warnings for nanotechnology” (Hansen, Maynard, Baun and Tickner (2008),  DOI:10.1038/nnano.2008.198) systematically compares progress in nanotechnology with each of the EEA’s twelve lessons, and assesses where progress is being made, and where we could be doing better.   

And the findings?  Some of the lessons have begun to sink in, but overall, it looks like a refresher course in responsible nanotechnology wouldn’t go amiss.

In the commentary, we conclude:

“The picture is not as bleak as it could be. While progress towards developing sustainable nanotechnologies is slow, we do seem to have learnt some new tricks: asking more critical questions early on; developing collaborations that cross discipline, department and international boundaries; beginning the process of targeting research to developing relevant knowledge; engaging stakeholders; and asking whether existing oversight mechanisms are fit for purpose.

But are we doing enough? The question seems not to be whether we have learnt the lessons, but whether we are applying them effectively enough to prevent nanotechnology being one more future case study on now not to introduce a new technology. Despite a good start, it seems that we have become distracted on the way – nanotechnology is being overseen by the same government organizations that promote it; research strategies are not leading to clear answers to critical questions; collaborations are not being as productive as is needed; and stakeholders are not being fully engaged. In part this is attributable to bureaucratic inertia, although comments from some quarters – such as “risk research jeopardizes innovation” or “regulation is bad for business” — only cloud the waters when clarity of thought and action are needed.

If we are to realize the commercial and social benefits of nanotechnology without leaving a legacy of harm, and prevent nanotechnology from becoming a lesson in what not to do for future generations, perhaps it is time to go back to the class-room and re-learn those late lessons from early warnings.”

Nanotechnology is all about the future.  But it seems an occasional glance back in history is needed to set the best course of action for success.

EEA’s Twelve Late Lessons:

1. Acknowledge and respond to ignorance, uncertainty and risk in technology appraisal. 

2. Provide long-term environmental and health monitoring and research into early warnings. 

3. Identify and work to reduce scientific ‘blind spots’ and knowledge gaps. 

4. Identify and reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to learning. 

5. Account for real-world conditions in regulatory appraisal. 

6. Systematically scrutinize claimed benefits and risks. 

7. Evaluate alternative options for meeting needs, and promote robust, diverse and adaptable technologies. 

8. Ensure use of ‘lay’ knowledge, as well as specialist expertise. 

9. Account fully for the assumptions and values of different social groups. 

10. Maintain regulatory independence of interested parties while retaining an inclusive approach to information and opinion gathering. 

11. Identify and reduce institutional obstacles to learning and action. 

12. Avoid ‘paralysis by analysis’ by acting to reduce potential harm when there are reasonable grounds for concern. 

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[1]  At the time of posting, the direct link to the “Late Lessons” report was down (that link ishttp://reports.eea.europa.eu/environmental_issue_report_2001_22).  As an interim measure, I have linked to a copy of the report posted at www.genok.org.

This post first appeared on the SAFENANO blog in July 2008

“Nanotechnology” as an overarching concept is great for sweeping statements and sound bites, but falls short when it comes to real-world decision-making.  As nanoscale technologies are increasingly used in everything from antimicrobial socks to anti-cancer drugs, perhaps its time to rethink how we talk about the myriad diverse technologies that fall, slip or are forcibly squeezed under this all-encompassing banner.

At last year’s Bernstein Symposium, I had the pleasure of listening to National Public Radio science journalist Richard Harris talking about the latest greatest technology-not nanotechnology, but yellowtechnology.  A rather liberal re-interpretation of Richard’s lecture goes something like this: 

“Yellowtechnology is the next technological revolution-if you think biotechnology and information technology are cool, just wait until you see what yellowtech can do.  Yellow makes everything faster; smarter; hotter.  Want more powerful power tools?  Just add yellow.  Got to have a faster, sleeker sports car?  Make it yellow.  And everyone knows that yellow is the surest route to making good food great-from M&M’s to mustard.  

“The beauty of yellowtech is that it reflects what nature has been doing for millennia.  Daffodils, the sun, canaries-everywhere you look, the natural world is exploiting yellowtech.  In developing this new technology we are simply treading in the footsteps of mother nature, and producing new products that are environmentally friendly to their core.  In the twenty first century, yellow is the new green.

“But care is needed-who hasn’t experienced the dark side of a carelessly discarded banana skin? Yellowtech may be the next best thing, but we need to learn how to use it responsibly.  We need new research to discover where yellow might be harmful.  We need regulations to ensure safe use.  And we need transparency so we know where yellow is being used, and what the consequences might be.  Is your yellow rubber duck safe? If not, how would you know?”

[long pause]

“I’m sorry what was that?  I was supposed to be talking about nanotechnology, not yellowtechnology?  OK, let’s start again…

“Nanotechnology is the next technological revolution-if you thought we could change the world with biotechnology and information technology, just wait until you see what nanotech can do…”

The above delivery is inspired by rather than transcribed from Richard’s lecture (A video of the original lecture can be viewed from here), but it does encapsulate a critical point-a grand idea that is sufficiently broad can be used-or abused-to almost any purpose, and in the end becomes meaningless.

The grand idea of nanotechnology has unquestionably stimulated much new science and technology around the world, and has energized the quest to develop scientific knowledge targeted at improving quality of life.  Yet when it comes to identifying its benefits, addressing its risks and overseeing its safe use, it is as slippery (and some would argue as meaningless) a concept as yellowtechnology.  

Under this grand idea, there is the temptation to redefine the most trivial advances as “nanotechnology” in order to emphasize the scale and magnitude of the new technological revolution. But there is also the lure of mixing and matching risks-either to over-stress the dangers of the new technology, or to justify a ragbag of studies as a coherent risk research strategy.  And so it becomes conceivable that consumers might reject new technologies for energy harvesting because a nanotech-based toothpaste gets a bad rap (a hypothetical example), or a multi-million dollar materials characterization facility is justified on the grounds of what it might hypothetically contribute to preventing occupational exposures.

As businesses, governments and consumers are faced with making increasingly sophisticated decisions on how nanotechnology is and is not used, it becomes more important to differentiate between the grand idea, and the products and processes it leads to.  

This process of “decoupling” is the only way of ensuring intelligent and informed conversations about product-specific benefits and risks.  

By decoupling different expressions of nanotechnology from the overarching concept, it becomes possible to make informed decisions on the resulting nanotechnologies, rather than the idea of nanotechnology.  Focusing on the products of the grand idea, rather than the idea itself, regulators can begin to talk about how a specific substance (like nanoscale silver) might present new challenges, without being sidetracked by other unrelated nanomaterials. Or consumers can begin to have informed conversations about the pros and cons of certain products-say, nanoscale electronics-without being baffled by claims and counter-claims associated with unrelated “nanotech” products.

The grand idea of nanotechnology has taken such firm root around the world that decoupling it into its component technologies and products will not be easy.  But if we are to avoid nanotechnology becoming as farcical asyellowtechnology, it’s something we need to do-the sooner the better.

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This post first appeared on the SAFENANO blog in May 2008